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In this paper we analyze the cost structure of the UK airport industry by estimating a variable cost 
function for the period 1994-2005. Overall results suggest that the long run average costs curve is U-
shaped: it decreases until passenger traffic reaches approximately five millions, it remains flat over the 
range between five and fourteen million passengers and afterwards it starts to increase. Moreover, our 
findings provide evidence consistent with the existence of some degree of overcapitalization for the 
largest regulated airports. Finally, we analyze whether different forms of ownership entail cost 
differentials across airports and we find that privately owned airports are characterized by lower costs 
with respect to public and mixed ones, although cost differentials shrank over time as public and mixed 
airports improved their rate of cost reduction. Main results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity at the 
airport or market level and to possible endogeneity biases. Possible regulatory and policy implications of 
these results are also discussed. 
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During the last twenty years, in the majority of developed economies around the world, the 
airport sector has experienced important changes regarding ownership structure, governance and 
regulation. Far from being regarded as public utilities offering aviation services to airlines and 
passengers, airports are considered as multi-product firms supplying the market a bundled group 
of services (OFT 2006). Apart from handling passenger traffic, other activities include shipping 
airfreight (including mail), providing air-taxi services and general aviation, acting as a base for 
flying training, aircraft maintenance, flight testing and corporate jet activity, and providing a 
large number of other specialist aviation services. Airports are no longer thought as modal 
interfaces but as global gateways for tourism and commerce which play an important role in the 
air transport industry and in the economic and social development of the region they serve. 
Nowadays airports, independently from their ownership structure, are commercially oriented 
enterprises with increasing shares of revenues coming from non-aeronautical business. 
The evolution of the airport sector over the last decades is linked to the fast growth of the world's 
airline industry and to the increased competition among airlines fostered by the spreading out of 
low cost carriers. Institutional and governance changes took place within the context of a wider 
process of extensive reforms of the utility and transport sectors realized in most OECD countries, 
characterized by the privatization of public enterprises and by the introduction of economic 
regulation. 
The process of privatization started at the end of the eighties in the UK and was successively 
pursued by most of developed countries with different degrees of private sector involvement to 
the ownership/management of airports. The only exception has been the US, where airports have 
remained mostly municipal or regional-government owned and operated; moreover in Canada 
the management of government owned airports has been transferred to not-for-profit local airport 
authorities. Often, though not always, the privatization process has been accompanied by price 
regulation in order to prevent possible abuse of market power. The form of price regulation 
varies from country to country, with most being cost-based in principle so that the airport is 
expected to achieve financial break-even, including a fair return on the capital invested. Some 
forms of price regulation, such as the Rate of Return regulation may lead to inefficient capital 
investment and to low incentives to cost reduction; other forms of regulation, such as the price 
cap, do not regulate profits, but rather prices and set incentives to improve efficiency by allowing 
airports to benefit from productivity improvements and cost savings; in some countries there is 
no formal price regulation, but only monitoring of privatized airports. 
Privatization and/or commercialization of airports was mainly pursued in order to gain access to 
private sector financing for capacity expansion and to improve economic efficiency. Several 
contributes analyze the impact of ownership and institutional form changes on airports 
performance: among the most recent we mention Oum, Yan and Yu (2008) who analyze a panel 
of world's major airports. As it is often the case in the literature on the ownership relative 
efficiency of public utilities (Newbery, 1999), the evidence on this issue is not completely clear 
cut, although privately owned airports seem to be characterized by somewhat lower costs. 
A different strand of the empirical literature has analyzed technical change and productivity 
growth in the airport sector and has suggested that several factors, others than ownership form, 
may explain efficiency differentials: size, hub status, degree of market competition, type of 
regulation, environmental variables are some of the possible efficiency drivers observed in 
applied works; for an exhaustive survey of this literature we refer to Fung et al. (2008). 3 
Another subject which has been extensively discussed in the literature is related to airports 
regulation, both in term of the need for regulation than in term of the identification of pricing 
schemes able to provide incentives for cost savings, optimal capacity investments and good 
services quality. The existence of a trade-off between (imperfect) competition and economic 
regulation has been supported by several authors: both a more effective regulation and a more 
competitive landscape have been called for by economists and practitioners. Among others, 
Starkie (2008) and Niemeier (2009) provide excellent discussions on these issues. 
In this paper we add to the applied literature by analyzing the cost structure of the UK airport 
sector observed over the period 1994-2005. As a matter of fact, a detailed analysis of the airport 
industry cost structure is missing, one of the few exceptions being Pels et al. (2003), who analyze 
inefficiencies and scale economies on a panel of European airports.
3 Furthermore, as noted by 
Oum and Fu (2008) most of the empirical studies dealing with efficiency and productivity 
analysis cannot provide reliable measures of scale economies because they often neglect non-
aeronautical services outputs, which account on average for more than 40 % of total revenues of 
an airport, and because they often assume that airports are free to adjust the capital stock even in 
the short run: such assumption is not realistic within the context of infrastructure sectors and 
might lead to non-negligible bias in cost economies evaluation. 
In our empirical work we estimate a variable cost function conditional on a given level of the 
capital stock, after taking into account heterogeneity among airports and we discuss cost 
economies measures derived both for the short and the long run. Moreover, we investigate 
whether is possible to detect cost differentials between airports characterized by various forms of 
ownership. 
Industry cost structure analysis may be interesting for both regulators and investors, as well for 
policy makers as it provides useful information necessary for defining regulated prices, for 
understanding the efficient industry configuration, in term of number and size of operators, and 
for deciding optimal investment/divestment plans. 
In the next section we illustrate the institutional setting of the UK airport sector, we briefly 
describe previous empirical works and we point out the main issues which feed the actual debate. 
In section 3 we present the database; in section 4 we show the empirical model and discuss the 
econometric issues involved. Section 5 comments empirical results and is followed by the 
conclusions. 
 
2. Institutional framework 
 
The 1986 Airports Act has defined the present structure of the UK airport industry by realizing 
the privatization process announced in the 1985 White Paper on airports policy. At that time 
nearly all airports were owned by the public sector, either by the British Airport Authority 
(BAA) or by local governments. BAA had the largest share of the market as it owned seven 
airports, four in Scotland and three in the London region (Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted), 
while the other largest local authority airport was Manchester. 
In 1987 all the share capital of BAA were transferred to the private sector by flotation and BAA 
became BAA plc. Between 1993 and 1999 many local government owned airport assets were 
also sold. Not all airports have been sold to the private sector or introduced private equity 
capital: Manchester (UK's fourth largest) belongs to a consortium of local governments in North 
                                                 
3See also Tolofari et al. (1990) for seven BAA airports, Doganis et al. (1995) for 25 international airports, Salazar de 
la Cruz (1999) for 16 Spanish airports, Martin et al. (2009) and Abrate and Erbetta (2010) for a panel of Spanish and 
Italian airports, respectively. 4 
West England and some local governments still retain a majority share in several airports. 
Furthermore, ownership by unquoted private companies (BAA plc was the exception) has not 
prevented several of the airports changing hands since they were first transferred to the private 
sector, some several times (see table 2). The UK airport industry is thus a mixed private-public 
sector industry but dominated by the private ownership of assets with a strong presence of 
foreign investors.
4 
At the time of privatization of BAA in 1987 it was assumed that major airports had significant 
market power linked to their natural monopoly characteristics which called for the need of 
economic regulation. Airport designated to be regulated after the 1986 Airports Act were 
Manchester, Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted. The sector specific regulator is the Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) and price-cap regulation was applied to airports charges with regulatory 
reviews scheduled every five years and caps set in order to allow for a rate of return consistent 
with the cost of capital.
56 
This approach is supposed to provide the regulated firm with incentives for efficiency because 
possible savings in expenditure exceeding those anticipated at the price revision may enhance 
company profitability. Some of the recent literature (Armstrong et al. 1994) has argued that this 
approach fails to give adequate incentives to invest because of problems of regulatory 
commitment, the longevity of sunk investment and the ex-post opportunism that this can give 
rise to. On the other hand, others (Littlechild 2003) have noted that pressures on regulators have 
led, in practice, to a convergence of the RPI--X approach with rate-of-return regulation, the latter 
generally regarded as encouraging overcapitalization and excess capacity. As far as the airport 
industry is concerned, there is a debate on the choice of revenues to include in the determination 
of the cap: when both aeronautical and non aeronautical revenues are taken into account (single-
till), capacity constrained airports tend to lower aeronautical charges in order to remain under the 
cap, since more revenue is made on the non aeronautical side. In this situation charges are 
lowered when efficiency implies they should be raised and airlines will capture location and 
scarcity rents that could be earned by the airport. 
Within the debate about the optimal regulatory policy, the absence of the necessary conditions 
for airport regulation is also discussed (e.g. Martin and Socorro 2009). 
Some authors suggest that the natural monopoly argument for economic regulation is unlikely to 
hold for airports. In particular, Starkie (2001) suggests that the characteristics of the airport cost 
structure do not support the need for regulation: when airports operate in a region where the long 
run marginal cost curve is increasing it is appropriate to set charges above average costs; as the 
actual regulatory system implies average cost pricing, it might be the case that price regulation 
may lead to inefficiently low prices. Since there is some (weak) evidence on the existence of 
long run diseconomies of scale for medium-large airports,
7 Starkie argues that deregulation 
                                                 
4When BAA was privatized the government capped the amount of shares that any one shareholder could hold to 15 
per cent but, following a ruling by the European Court of Justice that this restriction impeded the free movement of 
capital in the European Union, it was removed in 2006. Soon afterwards the ECJ's ruling BAA group was taken over 
by Ferrovial. 
5The return is calculated taking into account forecasts of air traffic, total revenues (including substantial revenues 
from commercial activities - single till approach), net operating expenditure after taking into account feasible 
improvements in efficiency, depreciation of existing capital assets and the proposed capital expenditure plan of the 
company. The last two components are the constituents of the regulatory asset base (RAB). 
6The regulated asset base for all three BAA airports (Heatrow, Gatwick and Stansed) was combined for the purposes 
of judging an allowable return. Starkie (2008) suggested that this had the effect of enabling BAA to leverage its 
market power at Heathrow in order to support under-performing assets at Stansted. Since 2002 the CAA has 
changed its policy so that each airport is now considered on a stand-alone basis. 
7Starkie and Thompson (1985) note that increasing long average costs in the airport industry may be the outcome of 5 
outcome might not necessarily be worse than the regulatory one. 
Indeed airports do have market power as the result of rents, mainly associated to land scarcity 
and locational issues; nevertheless Starkie (2001) argues that airports may be incentivated not to 
fully exploit their market power because of the existence of complementarities between the 
demand for aviation services and the demand for concession services.
8 More in general, possible 
abuse of market power is prevented by the increasing degree of competition between airports 
which took place during the last decades as a consequence of the liberalization of European air 
transports and of the growing importance of Low Cost Carriers.
9 Furthermore, recent detailed 
analysis conducted by the CAA and by the UK Competition Commission (2008) reveal that there 
is significant potential for airport competition in both the London and the North West 
(Manchester) regions of the UK as a result of the presence of significant overlaps in catchment 
areas for passenger traffic. Nevertheless the CC suggested that common ownership of three 
London airports by BAA was likely to adversely affect competition and in a successive report 
(2009) ruled BAA would have to divest itself of airports in either Gatwick or Stansted, and either 
Edinburgh or Glasgow. In December 2009 BAA sold Gatwick to Global Infrastructure 
Partnership. 
BAA Airports performance has been the focus of one of the first works on the UK airport 
industry conducted by Parker (1999). The author compares BAA airports efficiency scores, 
obtained with data envelopment techniques, before and after the privatization and does not find 
any significant difference; moreover his analysis reveals the presence of economies of scale in 
airport operations but without specifying the relevant output range. 
Only recently there has been a renewed interest towards the economic analysis of the UK airport 
sector. Barros (2008) analyses the technical efficiency of a sample of 27 UK airports observed 
over the period 2000-2005 by estimating a (translog) stochastic cost frontier which includes a 
trend variable. Efficiency rankings suggest that the top positions are achieved by small airports, 
while the most important airports (Gatwick, Heathrow and Manchester) get the weakest 
positions; moreover costs are found to be increasing over the sample period at a decreasing rate. 
On the same sample Barros and Managi (2008) compute different Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) indices and find that the majority of UK airports did not improve efficiency over the 
sample period. Moreover, when efficiency scores are sorted by ownership it seems that privately 
owned airports perform better than publicly owned ones. Similar results are found in another 
work by Barros and Weber (2009) who estimate Malmquist indices of TFP and show that over 
the sample period UK airport became less efficient and experienced technological regress; 
however a clear relationship is not observed between ownership and productivity nor between 
regulation and productivity. A Data Envelopment Analysis conducted by Assaf (2009) on a 
sample of 27 airports observed in 2007 suggests that small airports are operating in a increasing 
returns to scale region, while large ones seem to have reached full capacity and some have 
exceeded their optimal size. 
From the reviewed literature it is evident that main results need to be confirmed by further 
analysis. In particular we argue that more evidence is needed on the effects of ownership form on 
airport performance and on the study of the UK industry cost structure; we think the latter 
deserves more sophisticated analysis given the possible policy implications that can arise. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the complex way in which airports expand. 
8In 2005, other operational activities generated about 70% of the UK BAA airports profits: in the case of Gatwick, 
profits generated by airport charges were even negative, as in the case of Manchester Airport. This however could 
also reflect the method used by airports to allocate costs, or it could result from cross subsidies from commercial 
services to aviation operation under a single till price cap system. 
9For a recent discussion on the relations between airports and airlines see Oum and Fu (2008). 6 
 
3. The data 
 
The dataset used in this study consists of a balanced panel of the major 25 UK airports observed 
over the period 1994-2005. The main source of data is the statistical series "The UK Airport 
Industry" published each year by the Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries at the 
University of Bath. Additional information was sourced from airports accounts and from UK 
National Statistics, as specified whenever relevant. 
The summary statistics reported in Table 1 suggest that in the UK airport industry there is high 
variability in terms of size. In particular, the size distribution of airports is highly skewed to the 
right: for example, if we consider the total number of passengers, about 78% of the observations 
have a lower value than the mean, and similarly in the case of the work load units. The skewness 
of the size distribution is driven by the presence of two very large airports, notably Gatwick and, 
in particular, Heathrow.
10 In Section 5 we will discuss both how these large size differentials 
might affect our estimation results and how we have dealt with the issues they rise. 
In Table 1 we provide some descriptive statistics on the variables used in the empirical 
application. Variable costs (VC) are defined as operating costs less depreciation, while the price 
of non-labor inputs (oc) has been computed as the weighted average of i) the Construction 
Output Price Index -COPI- (as a proxy for the price of materials); ii) a price index of water, gas 
and electricity services and iii) the RPI (as a proxy for the price of other services paid by 
airports).
11 The price of labor (w) is obtained by the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE) as the average gross wage paid to employees that live in the local authority where the 
airport is located. While in most empirical applications (e.g. Barros, 2008) the price of labor is 
computed as the ratio between labor costs and the number of employees, we believe that this 
procedure is problematic in the context of the UK airport sector because the sensible differences 
in outsourcing practices across airports
12 make it unlikely that unit labor costs reported in the 
statutory accounts are representative of the "true" price of labor that airports face in their local 
labor market: its use as a proxy for the price of labor might therefore tend to exacerbate possible 
measurement errors and endogeneity biases.
13  Pax represents the airport total number of 
passengers; cargo is the airport total tones of cargo (including mail); wlu is the working load 
units, which is defined as one passenger or 100 kg of cargo and mail; atm represents the airport 
air transport movements, defined as landings and takeoffs of aircrafts engaged in the transport of 
passengers, cargo or mail on commercial terms; com is the revenue from "other operational 
activities" (deflated with the RPI index), which include apron services, baggage handling, 
retailing, on-site property rental and car parking . 
A more in depth discussion for the definition of the stock of capital and of capital costs is 
needed. The perpetual inventory method was used to reconstruct a series of the capital stock. In 
particular, for many airports we have exploited the capital stock revaluations that have occurred 
                                                 
10There are also two very small airports, Southend and Blackpool. 
11The weights have been proxied by the cost shares of materials, utility bills and residual services in non-wage costs 
as reported in BAA airports statutory accounts, respectively. 
12The major differences in outsourcing practices arise mainly in the case of handling services and air traffic control 
facilities. 
13The use of ASHE data is however justified as long as employees of a given airport live in the same local authority 
where the airport is located and provided that their average wage is fairly well represented by the wage reported in 
the ASHE. As robustness checks, we also used the median, rather than the average wage reported in the ASHE and 
the ratio between labour costs and average number of employees of the airport and main results were very similar to 
those reported in the paper. 7 
over our sample period and we have considered the revaluation year as the baseline.
14 Whenever 
a revaluation did not occur we considered 1994 as the baseline year. Capital costs have been 
computed as the product of the capital stock and the user cost of capital, the latter calculated as 
the sum of the depreciation rate and the opportunity cost of capital.
15 
As far as the ownership definition is concerned, we have defined an airport as "public" (pub) 
whenever the majority ownership belongs directly or indirectly to one or more municipalities; in 
turn, an airport has been defined as "mixed" (mix) whenever private investors retain the majority 
control but local councils hold a substantial minority stake (i.e. bigger than 20-30%) or when the 
airport is under public ownership but the management is fully delegated to private investors (e.g. 
Luton after 1998); finally, an airport that does not belong to either groups is defined as "private" 
(priv). As of 1994, 12 airports in our sample were publicly owned, against 11 under private 
ownership and one which is defined as mix; in turn, in 2005, 13 airports were privately owned, 
against 6 and 5 under public and mixed ownership, respectively. Table 2 reports, for each airport, 
its ownership status and its changes over the sample period whenever they occurred. 
 
4. Model specification 
 
4.1. Theoretical framework 
 
Most econometric studies on the airport industry have estimated total cost functions, which are 
based on the hypothesis that firms minimize total costs in the absence of important fixities in 
capital inputs;
16 however, the hypothesis that airports can instantaneously adjust their capital 
stock may be considered unrealistic. In fact, in the airport industry, the nature of the capital stock 
is such that it can be considered as a quasi-fixed input in the short run: the capacity of an airport 
in terms of runaways, terminals, apron areas and other relevant infrastructures is usually built in 
order to meet the demand which is expected to arise over a long term horizon; moreover, the 
existence of stringent environmental and planning restrictions limits the possibility of adjusting 
the capital stock in response to changes in demand. The practice of estimating a total cost 
function when important inputs cannot be easily adjusted in the short run may generate 
significant estimation biases in the parameters representing the underlying industry technology 
and therefore may lead to misleading estimates of cost economies (Shankerman and Nadiri, 
1986). 
In this paper we allow for the possibility that airports operate off their optimal expansion path as 
we assume that airports minimize variable costs conditionally on a given level of the capital 
stock: after estimating a variable cost function we will discuss cost economies measures derived 
both for the short and the long run. In what follows we briefly show, following Nadiri and 
Schankerman (1986) and Casarin (2007), how to derive long run measures of economies of scale 
from the estimated short run variable cost function. 
Let us consider a generic variable cost function: 
                                                 
14We have assumed a constant depreciation rate of 4.5%. The resulting capital stock series was deflated with the 
COPI index. 
15The opportunity cost of capital has been proxied by the weighted average cost of capital, which in turn has been 
derived from the CAA assumptions for the WACC at the relevant price reviews included in sample period. In 
particular, for airports under public ownership we have simply assumed that their WACC can be proxied by the 
CAA's assumptions for Manchester Airport, while for private and mix airports we have assumed that their WACC is 
equal to that assumed for BAA's regulated airports. Nevertheless, the differences in WACC for BAA and 
Manchseter airports have always been very small. In practice, the price of capital ranges between 12 % and 12.5 %. 
16See, for instance, Barros (2008) and Martin et al. (2009). 8 
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where  y  is a vector of outputs, w is a vector of variable input prices and k  is the capital stock, 
which is assumed to be fixed in the short run. 
If we define the capital costs as rk  (where r  is the user cost of capital), we can derive the 
following short run total cost function: 
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The equilibrium level for the quasi fixed factor,  ) , , ( r w y h k =
∗  , is defined implicitly by the 
envelope condition as follows:  0 ) / ( / = + ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂
∗ ∗ r k VC k STC , where 
∗ ∂ ∂ k VC/  is the shadow 
price of capital, which in equilibrium needs to be equal to its market price. After substituting the 
optimal demand function for capital (
∗ k ) in the short run total cost function (STC ), it is possible 
to derive the long run total cost function: 
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From equation (2) it is possible to derive the elasticity of short run total costs with respect to 
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The elasticities in equation (4) are based on the hypothesis that the capital stock is fixed in the 
short run and, as such, they do not provide information on long run elasticities, which are the 
relevant cost economies measures that should determine long run industry configurations. 
Nevertheless, the variable cost function can be used to retrieve long run output elasticities. After 
differentiating equation (3) and rearranging, it is possible to obtain the following expression for 
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where  ) / ( k VC z ∂ ∂ − =  is the shadow price of capital. Equation (5) shows that the long run output 
elasticity depends on the short run measure, on the difference between the shadow price and the 
market price of the fixed capital stock and on the sensitivity of the latter to output changes. 
If the capital stock is at its long run equilibrium level (i.e. if 
∗ = k k ), the shadow and the market 
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Unlike the common practice in the empirical literature of evaluating the above expression at 9 
sample levels of the capital stock, equation (6) is a valid measure of long run scale economies 
only if it is evaluated at k=k*
17 In turn, k* can be computed from the envelope condition 
0 ) / ( / = + ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂
∗ ∗ r k VC k STC  using numerical methods if necessary. Most of empirical works 
that have estimated variable cost functions have neglected the importance of evaluating equation 
(6) at the long run equilibrium value of the quasi fixed input, thus potentially deriving biased 
estimates of long run output elasticities and cost economies measures.
18 
On the basis of long run output elasticities it is possible to derive an expression for long run scale 
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Short run scale economies may be particularly relevant when computed in the case of industries 
characterized by the presence of significant infrastructures that cannot be easily modified in the 
short run, like most network industries or the airport and port sectors: within these industries, 
short run scale economies are sometimes also referred to as economies of density since they 
measure the impact on variable costs of outputs expansions, given the level of installed capacity. 
 
4.2. Empirical model 
 
For the variable cost function in equation (1) we assume a translog functional form. Its main 
advantage is that it is a flexible form as it is a second order approximation to an unknown 
function and therefore it does not impose strong a priori restrictions to the underlying production 
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17If the production technology is homothetic, equation 6 could be correctly evaluated at the sample value of the 
capital stock, given that the optimal input ratios are constant along a radial output expansion path. 
18One of the very few papers that have adopted the correct procedure is Casarin (2007) in the case of the gas 
industry in Argentina and Great Britain. 
19Recent papers that have adopted a translog functional form in the case of the airport industry are Martin et al. 
(2009); Pestana Barros (2008) and Oum et al. (2008), among the others. 10 
 
  it VC  denotes variable costs of firm i at time t. The vector of variable factor prices, P, is defined 
as   ] ; [ oc w P P   , where the subscript w  and oc stands for labor and other variables inputs, 
respectively; k denotes the capital stock; pub is a dummy variable equal to one for publicly 
owned airports and zero otherwise; mix is a dummy equal to one for mixed ownership airports 
and zero otherwise, while   it u   is an error term. 
The vector of output Y is defined as [wlu, atm, comm.] where wlu denotes the workload units, 
atm the number of air transport movements and comm the revenue from non aeronautical 
sources. It is worth noting that, unlike most of the empirical studies on the airport industry, we 
have included the revenue from non aeronautical charges as an output because of its increasingly 
importance as a revenue source for many airports. Moreover, as a robustness check, in one 
model specification we have adopted an even more extended specification of the output vector 
by including the number of passengers (pax) and the tons of cargo and mail (cargo) instead of 
the number of workload units: as far as we know, this is one of the very few econometric works 
on the airport cost structure that adopts a four-outputs specification. 
To correspond to a well behaved production structure, the variable cost function must satisfy a 
set of regularity conditions: it must be linearly homogeneous, non-decreasing, concave and 
symmetric in factor prices; non-decreasing in output; non-increasing and convex in the fixed 
input. In particular, the properties of linear homogeneity and symmetry in factor prices are 
imposed prior to estimation;
20 in turn, concavity in input prices of the cost function is verified if 
the Hessian is a negative semi-definite matrix, while monotonicity in factor prices requires that 
costs rise as factor prices rise; finally, monotonicity in output requires positive marginal costs. 
Both monotonicity and concavity conditions are checked after estimation. 
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Where Si is the share of input i in total costs and Xi is the optimal conditional demand of input i. 
After appending an error term to the cost shares, the system made up of the cost function and the 
labor share (the "other variable inputs" share equation has to be dropped to avoid the singularity 
problem stemming from the fact that the shares add up to one), can be estimated, after imposing 
the restrictions suggested by economic theory, with an efficient iterative seemingly unrelated 
regression procedure, which allows for cross equation correlation in the disturbance terms. 
 
4.3. Econometric issues 
 
The estimation of the system of equations (9) and (10) rises a set of important econometric 
issues. First, the panel data nature of the dataset could be exploited by letting the disturbance 
                                                 
20Homogeneity can be imposed by normalizing the dependent variable and factor prices with the price of one of the 
inputs: we normalized for the price of other costs (this normalization procedure is equivalent to impose the 




























β ), thus reducing the components of 
the P vector to one. Symmetry of the cost function is imposed by assuming that  sj js β β =  and  pn np β β =  before 
estimation. 11 
term in the cost function to be specified as the sum of two independent components: uit= ei+vit , 
where  eit reflects a time invariant airport specific component, while vit is an IID random 
component with zero mean, uncorrelated with itself, homosckedastic and uncorrelated with the 
regressors. If we allow ei to be correlated with the regressors, we could estimate the system with 
a SURE-fixed effects technique, by inserting a set of airport-specific dummy variables in the cost 
function. The advantage of this specification is that it avoids parameter biases arising from 
possible correlation between unobserved individual airport heterogeneity and the regressors. 
However, one pitfall of this fixed effects approach is that, when some of the explanatory 
variables have very little within group variability, it may yield imprecise (often downwards 
biased) parameter estimates: unfortunately, this is exactly what happens in our case, where the 
within variation of outputs is very small, if compared to the between variation.
21 Therefore, we 
decided to deal with unobserved heterogeneity in other ways. 
It seems reasonable to assume that some unobserved heterogeneity is linked to regional and 
market level characteristics. To this purpose we divided the airports in our sample into six 
different geographic markets, partly on the basis of considerations developed by both the Office 
of Fair Trade and the Competition Commission in the recent BAA case, and partly on our 
assessment based on distances between airports (two hours driving time). The markets identified 
by the Competition Commission
22 and the OFT studies were the London area and Scotland. The 
first market includes Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, London City, Luton, and Southampton, to 
which we have added the small airports of Southend and Norwich; the Scottish market is made 
up of Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen. We have identified four additional markets, namely, 
North of England (Newcastle and Durham-Tesside); Centre (Manchester, Humberside, 
Nottingham, Birmingham, Blackpool, Leeds and Liverpool); South East (Bournemouth, Cardiff, 
Bristol and Exeter) plus Northern Ireland (Belfast). Alternatively we considered the twelve UK 
NUTS level 1 regions where the airports are located as proxies for the regional markets where 
airports operate. 
In order to take into account regional and/or market level heterogeneity we specify the error term 
in the cost function equation as uit=δjt+vit, where δjt is a full set of market-year fixed effects that 
proxy for time varying unobserved heterogeneity in the geographic market j where the airports 
operate. The inclusion of these market-year dummies controls for shocks that may hit the 
markets where the airports are located, as well as for differences in the economic environment 
they face: as a result, they should capture both the regional specific business cycles and the 
(changes in) intensity of competition in each particular market (with the associated feedback 
effects on airport charges and, therefore, outputs), or in other locational related variables (e.g. 
population density, transport infrastructure, income wealth of the local population, economic 
development and so forth). As a robustness check, the market and year dummies have been also 
included in the cost function in a non-interacted way. In other words, the error term was 
specified as uit= δj +φt+vit. Furthermore, we have also checked that the results are not sensitive 
to the inclusion of region-year (rather than market-year) fixed effects: the advantage of using 
region-year fixed effects is that we should better capture local unobserved heterogeneity, given 
that we have twelve regions against six markets. 
Another important source of unobserved heterogeneity is that associated to managerial ability: in 
                                                 
21If some explanatory variables are well explained by a set of firm specific fixed effects, the fixed effects estimator 
is unlikely to provide precise estimates. We therefore regressed each output on a set of airport dummy variables and 
the adjusted R
2 turned out to be very close to one in the case of pax, atm, wlu and cargo. 
22We can note that in its final report, the Competition Commission choose not to define rigid geographic markets in 
the case of the UK airport sector. 12 
order to control for it and to take into account the impact on costs of changes in the corporate 
control of each airport, we have created a set of "group" specific dummy variables. For each 
airport that never shared a common owner with any other airport in the sample and that did not 
change owner over the sample period (e.g. Exeter Airport), we create a dummy which works 
essentially as an individual airport fixed effect; for those airports that did not share a common 
owner with any other airport in the sample but that did change owner over the sample period 
(independently on the type of owner, i.e. it might well be a "private" to "private" change), we 
create as many dummies as the number of owners; finally, for those airports that shared a 
common owner we create a dummy variable equal to one for all airports sharing the same owner 
and zero otherwise (this is the case, for example, of airports belonging to TBI, BAA, Manchester 
or National Express).
23 
One version of equation (9) has been estimated after including the group specific fixed effects: 
this is equivalent to assume that the error term is specified as uit=  δjt+  ψg +vit, where ψg 
represents the group specific dummy variables. The inclusion of ψg in the cost function should 
make our results robust to the existence of possible unobserved heterogeneity associated to 
managerial ability and may also pick up possible correlations in the residuals of airports that are 
under common ownership. Furthermore, given the way the group dummies have been built, they 
should be able to capture some of the unobserved heterogeneity that may drive the acquisition of 
a particular airport (e.g. a bad managerial performance): as a result, the inclusion of the ψg 
should be another way, complementary to IV estimation (see Section 5), to verify whether our 
estimates of the effects of ownership form on costs are robust to selection issues. 
Another important econometric problem (often neglected in most empirical studies that estimate 
cost functions) that has to be addressed is the possible existence of heterosckedasticity due to the 
large size differentials that characterize the UK airport sector. To deal with this problem we have 
estimated the SURE system assuming that the error term in the cost function is specified as 
uit=δjt+ei+vit, where we assume, as in Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), that vit, is IID∼(0,σv
2), 
ei∼(0,σei
2); and that they are uncorrelated with each other, with the error term in the labour share 
equation and with the regressors.
24 The advantage of this "Random Effects SURE" approach is 
that it allows the airport specific error term to be heterosckedastic; furthermore, if the ei were 
present but not taken into account, they would eventually show up as serial correlation in the 
error term, potentially invalidating statistical inference.
25 
                                                 
23In total, we have created 26 group dummy variables. 
24Although we refer to Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) for a detailed explanation, we can briefly describe the estimation 
strategy as follows. First, one estimates the SURE model in equations (9) and (10) after a within transformation of 
the cost function and retrieves the mean squared error of the cost function residuals as an unbiased estimate of σv
2 
then the system is re-estimated without the within transformation to get the cost function residuals  it u ˆ  The variance 
of the cost function residual λi
2  is computed as the mean squared error of the cost function residuals as   
∑ − T uit
2 2 ˆ ˆ λ . Since 
2 2 2
ei v i σ σ λ + =  , it is possible to estimate 
2
ei σ  as 
2 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ v i ei σ λ σ − =  Finally, one computes the 
transformation parameter   i θ  as  2 2 2 1 ei v v i Tσ σ σ θ + − = . It is then possible to transform the cost function by 
subtracting to each variable a fraction θi of its group mean and estimate the system by iterated SURE on the pooled 
sample, yielding efficient parameter estimates. 
25Serial correlation in the cost function error term could also arise for reasons not directly related to the omission of 
the airport specific random effect. Therefore, as a robustenss check, we have assumed that the error terms in both the 
cost function and share equations follow an AR(1) process; we have then applied a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation 
to the data and, finally, we have estimated equations (9) and (10) with an iterated SURE technique on the 
transformed data, as in Sung and Gorth (2000). The econometric estimates largely confirm our main results (both as 
far as the impact of ownership and the existence and magnitude of scale economies are concerned), thus suggesting 13 
A final econometric issue that needs to be addressed is the possibility that both output variables 
and ownership status may be endogenous to the model. It is important to recognize that possible 
endogeneity issues stemming from omitted variables at the group level (such as managerial 
ability) or at the market-year level are controlled for in (some of) our regression specifications. 
However, as robustness checks, we have also estimated the system with an instrumental variable 
technique (3SLS). 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
In this section we discuss empirical results obtained by estimating the system of equations (9) 
and (19) with different econometric techniques. 
First, we examine the validity of the restricted equilibrium framework using the test proposed by 
Shankerman and Nadiri (1986), to which we refer for an in depth discussion of the punctual 
procedures we have followed for its implementation.
26 The application of this test leads us to 
reject, at whatever confidence level, the null hypothesis that UK airports were operating at their 
long run equilibrium, which in turn suggests that previous papers that have estimated total cost 
functions in the case of the UK airport sector might have been misspecified. On the basis of this 
result we have computed the equilibrium levels of the capital stock (K*) as explained in Section 
4.1. When we compare the optimal equilibrium levels with their sample counterparts, computed 
at different percentiles of the size distribution, we find some empirical evidence consistent with 
the presence of a slight degree of undercapitalization for small-medium airports. On the other 
hand, largest airports tend to display a ratio K/K* higher than one which suggests the presence of 
overcapitalization; in particular, airports at the 75
th percentile of the size distribution show a 
moderate amount of overcapitalization which becomes more evident starting at the 90
 th 
percentile (i.e. about 20 million passengers). Recalling that largest UK airports (Heathrow, 
Gatwick, Stansted and Manchester) are the only ones designated for price regulation, our 
findings may support the idea that the regulatory approach adopted in the sector might have 
provided incentives for excess capacity. Alternatively, some authors (Starkie, 2008) suggest that 
some degree of overinvestment might be the result of largest operators with significant market 
power (i.e. BAA) trying to preempt entry in the relevant geographic market through investment 
in excess capacity. 
We then checked the regularity conditions of the cost function: in all models fitted cost shares 
are non-negative at each data point; marginal costs are non-negative for about 85 per cent of the 
sample while the concavity requirements for input prices are satisfied for all observations. 
Moreover, we tested whether the technology underlying the estimated variable cost functions is 
homothetic and a Wald test statistics leads us to reject this hypothesis at conventional confidence 
                                                                                                                                                             
that serial correlation is probably not a major concern in our empirical application (results are available from the 
authors upon request). 
26Shankerman and Nadiri (1986) note that if firms are in long run equilibrium, the rental price of the quasi-fixed 
capital stock is expected to be equal to its shadow price. Using the envelope condition discussed in section 4.1, one 
might derive an equation which implicitely defines the long run demand for capital. The implementation of the test 
requires the estimation of the system given by equations (9) and (10) together with the equation for the demand for 
capital. The estimation of this system yields consistent and efficient estimates insofar as firms are operating at their 
long run equilibrium path; otherwise, the estimates would be inconsistent. In turn, the estimation of equations (9) 
and (10) provides consistent estimates even when firms are off their long run equilibrium path (although they would 
be inefficient if firms were operating at the long run equilibrium). An Hausman type test is then constructed 
comparing parameters obtained from the estimation of equations (9) and (10) with those obtained from the 
estimation of the same equations plus the long run demand for capital. 14 
levels for all model specifications: this result further supports our empirical strategy of 
evaluating long run cost economies measures (equation (7)) at long run theoretical capital levels 
rather than at sample values. 
It is worth recalling that all results are robust to the inclusion of a set of market (or region)-year 
dummy variables that can capture time varying unobserved heterogeneity at the regional and 
market level linked to the presence of low cost airlines, different tourism flows and regional 
specific shocks or business cycles, differences in the competition intensity, in the transport 
infrastructure endowments, in population densities and in the rate of technical change, etc. 
Furthermore, supposing that some municipalities in different regions tried to help their local 
airport to attract low-cost airlines (e.g. by directly performing some marketing activity), it is 
possible that subsidised airports might display lower costs that should however be captured by 
the market-year dummies.
27 Finally, our results are also robust to the inclusion of additional 
control variables such as the percentage of international passengers and the Herfindhal Index of 
concentration in the geographic market where airports operate:
28 however, given that these 
variables turned out to be often insignificant, we have dropped them from the final specifications 
reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
All explanatory variables have been normalized by their sample medians and therefore first order 
coefficients can be interpreted as variable cost elasticities evaluated at the sample median. 
Parameter estimates of first order coefficients reported in Table 3 and 4 show a similar pattern 
across different model specifications. In particular, the wage elasticity is significantly positive 
and its magnitude is very similar to the sample median labor share as expected from economic 
theory. In turn, variable cost elasticities with respect to the different output measures are positive 
and statistically significant as expected and the variable cost elasticity with respect to capital is 
negative in six out of seven model specifications suggesting that, at the sample median, capital 
additions tend to reduce variable costs. 
Output variables have been treated as exogenous; nevertheless, although we control for 
unobserved characteristics at the market-year level, endogeneity issues may still arise: for 
example, if a negative shock to costs is transferred to customers through higher airport charges, 
then there might be a reduction in output levels so that the latter would be correlated with the 
error term. Even if this issue has always been neglected in the previous empirical literature in the 
case of the airport sector, we tackled this problem: in particular, we have estimated the system of 
equations (9) and (10) with 3SLS, after instrumenting output variables (and their interactions) 
with their lagged values, population in the NUTS 1 region where the airport is located and its 
interactions with exogenous variables. Parameter estimates reported in Table 3 as Model 2 are 
very similar to those reported in Model 1, when output variables have not been instrumented. 
In order to tackle the issue of the impact of ownership form on airports' cost performance, all 
estimated models include a dummy variable (priv) which is equal to one for airports under 
private control. The excluded group includes both public and mixed ownership airports as we 
could not reject the null hypothesis of the existence of significant cost differentials between 
those two groups. Estimates show that the ownership dummy variable is significantly negative in 
all model specifications with a magnitude that ranges between -0.11 and -0.21, thus suggesting 
that privately owned airports exhibit lower variable costs. This result is robust to possible 
problems stemming from reverse causality issues, as in Model 5 the ownership form has been 
                                                 
27All results are robust to the inclusion of region-year dummies as an alternative to market-year dummies as well as 
to the inclusion of market dummies and year dummies separately. Estimation results are available upon request. 
28The Herfindhal index in the market j was built as 
2 ) ( i J S H ∑ =  , where Si  is the share of passengers in market j 
served by airport i. 15 
treated as endogenous to the model and instrumented. In particular, following the two-step 
approach pioneered by Heckman (1978), we have estimated a reduced form equation which 
models the probability for an airport of being "private" as of time t. In particular, we let this 
probability to depend on previous profitability (Π), value added growth in the region (NUTS 1) 
where the airport is located (VAG) and on a set of year dummies: 
 
it t it it it VAG p ξ ϕ γ γ + + + Π = − 2 1 1            ( 1 1 )  
 
Equation (11) was estimated by OLS
29 and the predicted probability pit was used as an 
instrument for the ownership dummy priv using a 3SLS procedure. The exclusion restrictions 
underlying this identification strategy are that lagged airport profitability and regional growth of 
value added are not valid explanatory variables for the translog variable cost function.
30 The 
existence of cost differentials associated with private ownership is confirmed when we estimate a 
specification (Model 6) including a set of group dummies
31 which take into account unobserved 
heterogeneity linked to managerial ability, changes in majority control, different access to the 
capital markets, etc. As an additional robustness check we have alternatively inserted in the cost 
function a full set of airport individual dummy variables. With this approach ownership changes 
that occurred over the sample period allow us to identify the effect of ownership on airport costs: 
in other words we can take into account the possibility that the "ownership status" of an airport is 
not random, but potentially correlated with time-invariant airport specific unobserved 
characteristics that, if not controlled for, could bias the effects of ownership form on costs.
32 
Reassuringly, when we control for airport fixed effects the dummy priv retains its sign and 
statistical significance, although its magnitude falls to -0.08.
33 
Previous empirical evidence on the effect of institutional factors on airport performance is scant; 
furthermore, a potential drawback of this literature is that the issue of possible endogeneity of 
ownership form has been completely neglected. However, our results are consistent with those 
reported in Barros and Marques (2008) on a panel of European airports and in Oum et al. (2008) 
who estimate a Bayesian stochastic cost frontier on a panel of world major airports and found 
that privately owned airports, as well as those managed by independent authorities, are more 
efficient than those with various forms of government ownership and management combinations. 
As we noted in the Data Section, the UK airport sector is characterized by large size 
differentials, which may create heterosckedasticity problems and outliers or influential 
observations issues. In order to check whether our results are influenced by the presence of 
influential observations, we have estimated all models after dropping the two smallest airports in 
terms of passengers (Southend and Blackpool) or the two largest (Heathrow and Gatwick), and 
our main results were confirmed. Moreover, we have dealt with possible heterosckedasticity 
problems in Model 7, which is a random effects model estimated with a SURE technique as 
proposed by Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) that allows the individual error term to be 
                                                 
29Estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
30We tested the validity of these exclusion restrictions by augmenting the original model with both lagged airport 
profitability and regional growth of value added which never turned out to be statistically significant. 
31For details on the construction of the group dummies see the Section 3. 
32In section 4.3 we decided not to rely on the fixed effetcs approach as far as scale economies estimation is 
concerned because the insufficient within group variation of output variables would not allow us to measure their 
elasticities with enough precision. 
33All other variables retain their sign and statistical significance. As expected, the magnitude of the output variables 
coefficients is quite lower than that we have found in the non-fixed effects approaches. Estimates are available from 
the authors upon request. 16 
heterosckedastic, as explained in Section 4.3: estimates reported in Table 4 confirm main results. 
As a further robustness check we have augmented the translog variable cost function in equation 
(9) with a time trend, its square and its interactions with outputs, factor prices and capital stock. 
This alternative specification (Model 3) is aimed to model the impact of technological progress 
in the UK airport sector; in particular, it allows for the possibility that technical change is scale 
augmenting and non-neutral with respect to inputs. Although some of the trend related variables 
are imprecisely estimated, a test on the joint significance of all regressors that include the trend 
variable leads us to reject the null hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero at conventional 
confidence level.
34 Following Caves et al. (1981), we measure technical change as the common 
rate at which all inputs can be decreased over time while keeping outputs fixed (trend rate of cost 
reduction): ). ln / ln 1 /( ) / ln ( k VC t VC TC ∂ − ∂ − =
35 Estimates reported in Table 5 for the median 
airport in each year
36 show that technical change has been significantly positive in all years with 
an average rate of about 2 per cent: in particular, technical change declined from 2.8 per cent per 
year to 1.5 per cent in the first five years of the sample period while it stayed about constant 
(with an average rate of 1.9 per cent), albeit with minor fluctuations, in the remaining years. 
We have also allowed the rate of technical change to take on different values depending on 
airports' ownership status by interacting the time trend and its square with the priv dummy 
variable: in this way we can also investigate how cost differentials associated to ownership may 
have changed over time. The econometric estimates (not shown) suggest that technical change in 
the case of private airports fell relatively to the public and mix ones, while the dummy priv 
remains negative.
37 In particular, as data reported in Table 5 suggest, the average rate of cost 
reduction for private airports declined from 3.3 per cent to about 0.8 per cent (with an average 
rate of about 1.6 per cent over the sample period); in turn, in the case of public and mixed 
airports, the rate of technical change went up from 2 to 4 per cent, with an average rate of about 
2.6 per cent over the sample period.
38 Our econometric estimates indicate that in the early part of 
the sample period the average cost advantage of private airports might have been as high as 
twenty per cent but also that the differential shrank over the sample period to about ten per cent. 
The time pattern in the private/public-mix airport cost differential is confirmed if we include in 
the model a full set of airport fixed effects to take into account unobserved heterogeneity at the 
airport level (that might have driven changes in ownership form); however such cost differential 
turns out to be very small and not statistically significant in the last two years of the sample. 
As a final robustness check we have considered a more general model with airports fixed effects 
where we separately identify three ownership groups, namely private, mixed and public and we 
estimate a similar model to that reported in equation (9) after including two dummies (pub and 
mix) and their interaction with trend and trend square. The results confirm again that the 
performance of private airports deteriorated over the sample period, while that of mixed and, 
especially, public airports improved over time.
39 The empirical estimates show that both mixed 
                                                 
34We also tested the hypothesis that technical change was neutral and we had to reject it at conventional sign. levels. 
35The values of TC have been computed using the long run equilibrium values of the capital stock. 
36Our technical change figures are referred to the median airport in each year: in other words, all variables that enter 
the elasticities in the technical change formula are evaluated at their median value for each year. In this way we are 
able to account for the changes that occurred over the sample period in those variables that may affect technical 
change, namely outputs, input prices and capital stock. 
37Interaction terms between trend and trend square with the dummy priv are jointly significant (the p val. is 0.09). 
38The decline in the rate of cost reduction for private airports and the corresponding increase in the case of public 
and mixed ones is broadly confirmed if we include in the cost function a full set of airport fixed effects. 
39An F tests suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the interactions of trend and trend square with the 
dummy mix (pubb) are jointly equal to zero at the 5% (1%) level of significance. Full estimation results are available 17 
and public airports had statistically significant higher costs in the early part of the sample but 
that cost differentials progressively shrank and became null for the last years. 
These results imply that, although, on average, over the period 1994-2005 UK private airports 
had displayed lower costs, their relative cost advantage has shrunk over time with respect to both 
public and mixed airports, suggesting that the latter may have better succeeded in cutting costs 
over the sample period. Our findings are not consistent with those reported in Barros (2008), 
Barros and Managi (2008) and Barro and Weber (2009); nevertheless the discrepancy may be 
due to the different methodologies adopted and the sample period considered in this paper so that 
appropriate comparisons cannot be conducted. 
 
5.1. Cost economies 
 
Parameter estimates for the variable cost function allow us to derive long run cost economies 
measures computed as in equation (7). All findings, obtained from the estimation of different 
versions of our baseline model, are robust to the exclusion of either the two largest airports 
(Heathrow and Gatwick) or the two smallest (Southend and Blackpool). 
Table 6 reports punctual values for long run scale economies evaluated at different percentiles 
obtained by keeping the labour price fixed at the sample median of the entire sample and letting 
outputs and the optimal long run capital stock to vary across different percentiles. In all 
estimated models economies of scale tend to gradually decrease with the scale of operations, 
with values ranging on average (across models) between 2.08 at the 10
th percentile and 0.84 at 
the 90
th: in particular, for the median airport, scale economies are equal to about 1.35, thus 
implying that a one per cent proportional increase in all outputs would lead total costs to rise by 
0.74 per cent in the long run. Overall results suggest the presence of scale economies at least up 
to the 75
th percentile (which corresponds to an airport with about 5.6 million passengers, 83000 
atm and 6.5 million wlu)
40, while largest airports tend to experience diseconomies of scale 
starting on average between the 80
th and the 90
th percentile, i.e. for an airport with about 14 
million passengers, 148000 atm and 15 million wlu.
41 
In order to ensure that the values used in scale economies computations better reflect the 
characteristics of our sample,
42 we identify the i
 th percentile airport with respect to output j and 
use that company's capital stock and values for other outputs in the formula for scale 
economies.
43 Scale economies values reported in Table 8 are broadly consistent with the overall 
pattern shown in Table 7. 
As an additional robustness check we evaluated long run scale economies after splitting the 
sample into three size groups according to either atm, wlu or pax;
44 for each group we have then 
taken the median values for all variables involved in the computation. Again, results confirm that 
                                                                                                                                                             
from the authors upon request. 
40Examples of such airports are Newcastle and Nottingham. 
41Manchester, Stansted, Gatwick and Heathrow are those airports operating at output levels characterized by 
diseconomies of scale. 
42Scale economies values reported in Table 6 at the i
th percentile were computed by substituting in the relevant 
formula the i
th percentile value for each variable excluding labor price for which we always substituted the sample 
median value. 
43For example, in the first row of Table 8 we identified the airport corresponding to the i
th percentile of atm and, for 
computing scale economies, we have employed that airport's values of capital stock, wlu and pax, and not their 
corresponding percentiles. The same approach has been followed after identifying the airport corresponding to the i
th 
percentile of pax and wlu. 
44The cut-offs points defining the three size categories are 30000 and 100000 atm;1.5 and 6 million wlu and, finally, 
2 and 10 million pax. 18 
scale economies decrease alongside the size distribution and suggest that largest airports are 
operating under a diseconomies of scale regime. 
A similar picture is provided by the analysis of short run scale economies as shown in Table 7. 
Short run cost economies, in the airport industry, can be interpreted as economies of density: our 
results thus suggest that, for a given level of the capital stock, a proportional increase in all 
outputs is associated to a reduction in average variable costs for airports operating up to a level 
of outputs between the 50
th and the 75
th percentile of the size distribution. In particular, if 
compared with long run measures, short run scale economies tend to fall more rapidly with size 
so that at the 75
th percentile we cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant scale economies in 
five out of seven estimated models. Furthermore, diseconomies of scale observed for largest 
airports are on average less pronounced in the short than in the long run: this result is consistent 
with the finding of excess capacity for largest operators (Friedlaender et al., 1993). 
As far as the previous literature is concerned, there is scant empirical evidence on the cost 
structure of the airport industry. One of the few exceptions for the UK case is Tolofari et al. 
(1990) that estimate a translog variable cost function for the seven BAA airports observed over 
the period 1979-87 and find evidence of economies of scale up to 20.3 million wlu: this finding 
is broadly consistent with our result which however is based on a larger sample in a later period. 
Other studies, mostly conducted on European or US samples, find evidence of scale economies 
for small airports while larger airports are often found to operate under diseconomies of scale. 
Among them we mention Martin et al. (2009) who found, by estimating a total cost function for 
a panel of Spanish airports, unexhausted scale economies at any level of output although a 
possible drawback of this study is the assumption that the capital stock is freely adjustable and 
that commercial revenues are neglected; Salazar de la Cruz (1999) who applied non parametric 
methods to a panel of Spanish airports and find that average costs are U-shaped as they decrease 
up to 3.5 million passengers and then increase from 12.5 million; Pels et al. (2003) who estimate 
two separate frontiers for the production of passengers and air transport movements for a sample 
of European airports and find that the average airport (12.5 million passengers and 150000 atm) 
operates in a constant returns to scale region in the production of atm and under increasing 
returns to scale in the production of passenger movements; moreover they found that scale 
elasticity is decreasing in the number of passengers. The analysis of this short literature review 
suggests that any comparisons requires the use of much caution in interpreting the results 
because of non negligible differences in the methodological approaches, as well as sample and 
period of observation. 
The analysis of the cost structure of the airport industry may provide useful insights to the debate 
on the regulation of the sector. Our findings suggest that the largest UK airports operate in a 
region of diseconomies of scale so that long run marginal costs are higher than average costs: in 
this case, it is reasonable to expect that large airports set charges above average costs. Since the 
regulatory regime applied by the CAA is in practice based on a form of average cost pricing, it 
might be the case, ceteris paribus, that regulated charges are inefficiently low so that they may 
not provide the correct economic signals that would ensure allocative efficiency. Another 
implication of our results on the price regulation of the airport industry is relative to the 
determination of the X factor in the price cap formula. Since the productivity offset X required by 
the regulator at the price review should include a correction for the presence of non-constant 
returns to scale (Bernstein and Sappington, 1999), our results suggest that if the regulator is 
forecasting output growth over the regulatory period, she should proportionally reduce expected 
productivity improvements, given that UK regulated airports are operating in a region of 
diseconomies of scale. Finally, our analysis may offer some useful insights as far as the optimal 
industry configuration is concerned; for example, the existence of significant scale economies at 19 
least up to five million passengers should be considered by policymakers when required to 
decide on the construction of new airports that are unlikely to get to the efficient scale of 
operations: although the construction of new airports can lead to more competition in the sector, 
thus increasing consumer welfare, the presence of non negligible scale economies for smaller 
airports may push up average costs, potentially leading to inefficient entry, thus harming 
consumer welfare. 
Turning to the discussion on the existence of biased investment incentives in the UK airport 
industry, our findings of overcapitalization for largest airports might support the view that the 
price cap regime as implemented in the UK airport sector has assumed common features with 





In this study we estimate a translog variable cost function for a sample of 25 UK airports 
observed over the period 1994-2005. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
provide a detailed picture of the UK airport industry cost structure; moreover, we have 
conducted an in depth investigation on the possible effects of ownership form on airport 
performance. The choice of estimating a variable cost function conditional on a given stock of 
capital reflects the assumption that airports are not free to adjust capital inputs in the short run. 
Although the quasi-fixed nature of the capital stock has been neglected in the previous literature, 
our results suggest that observed airports are not operating along their long run equilibrium path, 
thus casting some doubts on the reliability of empirical findings based on the assumption that 
airports can freely adjust all inputs; in particular largest airports in the sample show a certain 
degree of overcapitalization. 
Our results suggest that over the period privately owned airports exhibit lower variable costs 
with respect to their public or mixed ownership counterparts: this finding is robust to the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity at the airport and market level and to the possible 
existence of ownership endogeneity issues. Moreover, we find a positive rate of cost reduction in 
the industry and ownership cost differentials shrinking over the sample period. This pattern 
might be explained by considering that, in the early part of the sample, public and mixed 
ownership airports were probably characterized by a relatively higher level of X-inefficiency, 
perhaps for the stronger agency problems associated to public ownership. However, our 
empirical findings also suggest that the cost advantage of private airports started to fall only at 
end of the 1990s, exactly when the competition in the UK airport industry -associated to the 
intensification of competition in the airline industry for the large scale entry into the sector of 
low-cost airlines- also increased. But, as noted in Hart's (1983) seminal paper, an increase in 
product market competition is likely to foster productivity growth precisely for those firms more 
likely to suffer from significant agency problems.
45 
Empirical estimates on scale economies suggest that the long run average cost curve is U-
shaped: average costs decrease until passenger traffic reaches approximately five millions; they 
remain flat in the range between five and fourteen million passengers and then start to rise. This 
finding is based on the estimation of models characterized by a rich output specification and 
holds across different models and estimation strategies. 
                                                 
45Another implication of Hart's (1983) paper is the use of debt as a discipline device in firms with agency problems: 
the increase in the rate of cost reduction of public airports might therefore also be associated to the elimination by 
the Labor government in 1998 of the borrowing restrictions that applied for publicly owned airports. 20 
The main policy implications of our results have been discussed in the previous section and may 
both add to the debate on the optimal design of the airport industry and provide useful 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Year Mean  S.D. Min  Max 
w  1994  12677 1517  10119 16646 
  2005  18254 2417  14359 25793 
oc  1994  133.2 0  133.2 133.2 
  2005  181.3 0  181.3 181.3 
pax  1994 4882 11055  5.692  52000 
  2005 8847 14706  6.115  67700 
cargo  1994 71.428  216.1  0.220  1077.4 
  2005 101.6  283.5  0  1396.7 
wlu  1994 5596 13150  8.679  63200 
  2005 9863 17334  7.485  81626 
atm  1994 58626  85863  5131 413545 
  2005 87465  103049  1548 472954 
com  1994 46724  122837  0  588591 
  2005 57668  130241  793  638043 
k  1994  235844 384499 1658  1394109 
  2005 561201  1556816  6049 7789200 
vc  1994 38582  78165  2178 369000 
  2005 62594  125900  4622 611800 
 
w: price labour (thousands of GB £) 
oc: price other cost (see text) 
pax: thousands of passengers 
cargo: thousands of tons of cargo and mail 
wlu:  thousands of work load units (see text) 
atm: number of air transport movements  
comm: non operational revenue (thousands of GB £) 
k: monetary value of capital stock (thousands of GB £) 
vc: variable costs (thousands of GB £) 
 









Bournemouth Mix  (1994);  Priv  (1995-2000); Pub (2001-05) 
Humberside Pub 
Nott-East Midlands  Priv (1994-2000); Pub (2001-05) 
Birmingham Pub  (1994-96); Mix (1997-2005) 
Newcastle  Pub (1994-2000); Mix (2001-05) 
Belfast Priv 
Cardiff  Pub (1994); Priv (1995-2005) 
Luton  Pub (1994-97); Mix (1998-2005) 
Blackpool  Pub (1994-2003); Mix (2004-05) 
Bristol  Pub (1994-97); Mix (1998-2000); Priv (2001-05) 




London City  Priv 
Norwich  Pub (1994-2003); Mix (2004-05) 
Southend Priv 
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Table 3: Variable cost function estimates 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
k   -0.087 (3.09) -0.173 (3.87) -0.067 (1.66) k   -0.095 (3.65)
w   0.413 (54.4) 0.411 (51.7) 0.407 (25.42) w 0.412 (57.23)
wlu   0.340 (8.26) 0.361 (5.55) 0.617 (10.39) pax 0.301 (8.21)
com  0.296 (8.81) 0.303 (5.85) 0.207 (4.50) cargo  0.020 (2.18)
atm  0.294 (5.45) 0.351 (3.68) 0.050 (0.59) com 0.38 (12.21)
priv  -0.158 (5.77) -0.171 (4.94) -0.214 (7.37) atm 0.197 (3.95)
2 k   0.202 (4.0) 0.213 (2.0) 0.192 (3.93) priv -0.145 (5.77)
2 w   -0.259 (3.88) -0.258 (3.64) -0.278 (3.94) 2 k   0.223 (4.12)
2 wlu   0.177 (4.22) 0.262 (3.23) 0.082 (1.93) 2 w   -0.300 (4.72)
2 com   0.071 (11.8) 0.071 (6.88) 0.050 (7.35)
2 pax   0.139 (2.00)
2 atm   0.204 (3.52) 0.041 (0.34) 0.217 (4.01) cargo2   0.001 (0.03)
w k ∗   -0.012 (-1.08) -0.004 (0.29) -0.011 (1.03) 2 com   0.088 (10.91)
wlu k ∗   0.006 (0.15) 0.098 (1.50) 0.090 (2.08) 2 atm   0.472 (4.31)
com k ∗   0.001 (0.05) 0.074 (0.71) -0.028 (0.79) w k ∗   0.005 (0.42)
atm k ∗   -0.248 (-4.31) -0.499 (4.79) -0.300 (5.33) k*cargo  -0.003 (0.23)
wlu w∗   -0.001 (0.06) -0.001 (0.05) 0.001 (0.04) pax k ∗   0.040 (1.02)
com w∗   0.001 (0.39) -0.006 (0.85) 0.001 (0.26) com k ∗   0.031 (0.96)
atm w∗   0.001 (2.67) -0.001 (0.84) 0.001 (1.53) atm k ∗   -0.362 (4.78)
wlu com∗   -0.190 (3.80) -0.486 (3.95) 0.096 (1.85) w*cargo  -0.019 (4.07)
wlu atm∗   0.001 (0.01) -0.001 (1.61) 0.001 (0.48) pax w∗ 0.005 (0.69)
com atm∗   0.205 (4.52) 0.700 (4.45) 0.133 (2.78) com w∗ 0.004 (0.86)
trend   - - -0.014 (1.17) atm w∗ -0.001 (2.95)
2 trend   - - -0.001 (0.87) com pax∗ -0.167 (3.94)
w trend ∗   - - 0.001 (0.39) cargo*comm  -0.034 (2.80)
k trend ∗   - - 0.002 (0.49) atm pax ∗ -0.040 (0.50)
atm trend ∗   - - 0.025 (3.10) cargo*atm  -0.036 (1.88)
com trend ∗   - - 0.008 (1.71) cargo*pax  0.012 (0.98)
wlu trend ∗   - - -0.035 (5.45) comm atm*   0.0217 (4.12)
 
Sure Estimates. 
Market-year dummies in Model 1,2,3 
Market dummies in model 4 
T Statistitics in parenthesis 
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Table 4: Variable cost function estimates 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
3SLS SURE SURE-RE
 k    -0.103 (3.05) 0.003 (0.10) -0.039 (1.09)
  w    0.412 (48.0) 0.412 (54.3) 0.411 (54.5)
  wlu    0.314 (5.54) 0.237 (5.58) 0.260 (5.07)
 com   0.365 (6.43) 0.410 (12.41) 0.346 (8.40)
 atm    0.242 (4.38) 0.086 (1.87) 0.204 (3.46)
  priv    -0.144 (1.69) -0.149 (2.31) -0.114 (3.51)
 
2 k    0.214 (3.45) 0.143 (3.10) 0.255 (5.31)
 
2 w    -0.171 (2.34) -0.343 (5.32) -0.261 (3.98)
 
2 wlu    0.156 (3.11) 0.067 (1.87) 0.114 (2.84)
 
2 com    0.199 (2.71) 0.064 (9.63) 0.066 (9.97)
 
2 atm    0.123 (1.86) 0.154 (3.20) 0.164 (3.15)
  w k ∗    0.011 (0.79) -0.011 (1.04) -0.009 (0.84)
  wlu k ∗    0.062 (1.16) -0.108 (2.94) -0.108 (2.72)
  com k ∗    -0.028 (0.47) 0.014 (0.36) -0.012 (0.33)
  atm k ∗    -0.330 (4.56) -0.022 (0.46) -0.071 (1.24)
  wlu w∗    0.002 (0.23) 0.003 (0.34) -0.004 (0.52)
  com w∗    -0.029 (2.08) 0.001 (0.28) 0.003 (0.68)
  atm w∗    -0.001 (0.14) -0.001 (3.67) -0.001 (1.90)
  wlu com∗    -0.264 (3.68) 0.020 (0.40) -0.084 (1.56)
  wlu atm∗    -0.001 (2.75) 0.001 (1.58) 0.001 (0.22)
  com atm∗    0.355 (4.91) -0.054 (1.20) 0.073 (1.57)
 
Market-year interaction dummies. in all models T statistics i parenthesis 
 
 



















 Full  sample  Priv  Pub-mix 
1994-95  0.028 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.033 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.020 
1995-96  0.028 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.031 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.024 
∗ ∗  
1996-97  0.018 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.019 
∗ ∗    0.017 
∗ ∗  
1997-98  0.015 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.015 
∗ ∗    0.017 
∗ ∗  
1998-99  0.019 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.017 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.024 
∗ ∗ ∗  
1999-00  0.020 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.016 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.027 
∗ ∗ ∗  
2000-01  0.017 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.011 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.026 
∗ ∗ ∗  
2001-02  0.018 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.010  0.031 
∗ ∗ ∗  
2002-03  0.019 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.010  0.034 
∗ ∗ ∗  
2003-04  0.016 
∗ ∗    0.006  0.031 
∗ ∗ ∗  
2004-05  0.021 
∗ ∗    0.008  0.040 
∗ ∗ ∗  26 
 
 
Table 6 Long run scale economies 
  Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  4  Model  5 Model  6 Model  7 
 10th    1.88 
∗ ∗ ∗    3.01 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.79 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.71 
∗ ∗ ∗    2.37 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.84 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.89 
∗ ∗ ∗   
 25th    1.49 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.78 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.53 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.55 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.71 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.59 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.54 
∗ ∗ ∗   
 50th    1.26 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.38 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.22 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.69 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.34 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.25 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.28 
∗ ∗ ∗   
 75th    1.06  1.11 
∗   1.10 
∗ ∗    0.96  1.06 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.18 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.14 
∗ ∗   
 90th    0.84 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.64 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.90 
∗   0.74 
∗ ∗ ∗    0.72 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.05 0.96 




Table 7 Short run scale economies 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
 10th    1.82 
∗ ∗ ∗    2.77 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.74 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.81 
∗ ∗ ∗    2.49 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.90 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.82 
∗ ∗ ∗   
 25th    1.44 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.53 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.47 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.52 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.64 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.71 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.47 
∗ ∗ ∗   
 50th    1.07 
∗   0.98  1.15 
∗ ∗    1.11 
∗   1.08 
∗   1.36 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.23 
∗ ∗ ∗   
 75th    1.03 0.97 1.13 
∗ ∗    0.92 1.00 1.23 
∗   1.10 
 90th    0.91  0.67 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.04  0.81 
∗ ∗    0.74 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.17 
∗   0.93 




Table 8. Long run scale economies: robustness checks 
   10th    25th    50th 75th 90th  95th   
atm  1.83 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.39 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.16
∗ ∗ ∗ 1.05  0.84
∗ ∗ ∗ 0.79 
∗ ∗ ∗   
wlu  1.72 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.40 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.24
∗ ∗ ∗ 1.08
∗ ∗ 0.86
∗ ∗ 0.79 
∗ ∗ ∗   
pax  3.13 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.54 
∗ ∗ ∗    1.50
∗ ∗ ∗ 1.00  0.92
∗ 0.82 
∗ ∗ ∗   
 small    medium    large   
atm  1.66 
∗ ∗ ∗      1.12
∗ ∗ ∗   0.82
∗ ∗ ∗  
wlu  1.67 
∗ ∗ ∗      1.14
∗ ∗ ∗   0.82
∗ ∗ ∗  
pax  1.67 
∗ ∗ ∗      1.15
∗ ∗ ∗   0.82
∗ ∗ ∗  
 
***=sign 1%; **=sign 5%; *=sign 10%. The null hypothesis is that scale economies are constant 
Estimates for atm and wlu from Model 1; estimates for pax from Model 4 
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